INTRODUCTION
My goal in this essay is to make a case for the relevance of the built environment to environmental ethics. As far back in philosophical history as Plato and Aristotle, the city has been linked to the good life for human beings. More recently, Hannah Arendt emphasized the importance of public spaces for the revelation of the human self in community. 1 This recognition of the relevance of public, communal spaces to the full flourishing of human life has been strangely absent in environmental ethical theories. As philosophers concerned with how humanly engineered systems have degraded wild environments and threatened nonhuman species, we have paid less attention to the built, artifactual, or domesticated environments in which humans actually live. This lack of attention is a lost opportunity for environmental ethics to reflect on and critique the specific spaces that we inhabit and to seek out connections between the problems in the built world and those in the wild.
There are several reasons for thinking that environmental ethics should take a closer look at the built environment. The most significant of these is that if we are to contribute to articulating the outlines of an environmentally responsible culture, we must be prepared to address the problems faced by people in the places they inhabit. Degraded urban, suburban, and rural environments are obstacles to the development of an environmental conscience. In addition, they Vol. 22 2 Justus Buchler, Metaphysics of Natural Complexes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) ; Nature and Judgment (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1955) ; and Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment, 2d ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1979 are objective constraints on our efforts to minimize waste and pollution and to enjoy a harmonious and integrated human existence in the natural world. Built environments affect how we perceive the natural world and how we understand ourselves. It is crucial, therefore, that we consider how we might critique the contemporary built environment and envision one more in consonance with environmental aspirations. Such a task calls for philosophical attention as strongly as the more typical concerns with nonhuman value and the health and integrity of wild ecosystems.
In this paper, I outline four different perspectives from which we can draw support for the argument that an environmental ethics of the built environment is an integral part of environmental ethics generally. The pragmatism of Justus Buchler helps to articulate the notion that the built environment reflects who we are and what our stand should be toward the natural world. 2 His conception of exhibitive judgment, in particular, allows us to describe a more intimate relationship between building or constructing and human beliefs and judgments about our place in nature than we might normally recognize. Moreover, his metaphysics helps to highlight the continuity between both human and nonhuman articulations of the actualities and possibilities which exist in the natural complexes around us. Buchler's pragmatism underscores why a different people in an environmentally responsible culture will both require and inevitably construct a different built environment than the one we now inhabit.
I also draw on Don Ihde's phenomenological argument that the built environment affects our own self-interpretation and self-understanding. 3 A new perception of the natural world cannot be separated from the construction of a new world in which what is perceived makes narrative sense. Thus, ethical arguments that favor protecting wilderness and wild species must be accompanied by an ethical analysis that addresses the question of how human beings as they are currently situated can construct for themselves a home space that will reflect and sustain such an ecologically informed world view. Langdon Winner's argument that technology is a "form of life" and that therefore the built environment constrains what and who we can be or become is relevant here, too. 4 His analysis helps to show the limits of a moral judgment that is also not, in Buchler's terms, exhibitive. That is, since human judgments are always already embedded in the built environment and since they exercise objective constraints on what is possible, ethical judgment about the value of nature needs to be linked to an awareness of the directions in which existing technologies and constructions are pushing us, independent of our intentions. Again, the argument is that 5 See Steven Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) ; "Habermas and the Ethics of Nature" in Roger Gottlieb, ed., The Ecological Community (New York: Routledge, 1997); "Marx and Alienation from Nature, " Social Theory and Practice 14, no. 3 (1988) : 367-87. Also, see Roger J. H. King, "How to Construe Nature: Environmental Ethics and the Interpretation of Nature," Between the Species 6 (Summer 1990): 101-08. 6 Bill McKibben, The End of Nature (New York: Doubleday, 1989 reflection on our artifactual surroundings needs to be as integral a part of the project to imagine an environmentally responsible culture as reflection on the value of nonhumans and our moral obligations to them.
Finally, I follow Steven Vogel in emphasizing the socially constructed aspect of the wild environment. 5 The "sociality" of both the built and wild environments suggests that we must reflect on how our construction of inhabited spaces both informs and facilitates our construction of wild nature as hostile or objectified "other." Vogel's argument helps to undermine the notion that there is an inherent dualism between the human, domesticated environment and the wild environment that undergirds a philosophical segregation of environmental ethics from ethical reflection on the humanized spaces in which we live. It is my hope that integrating these four positions with environmental ethical reflection may help us to articulate the ethical problems in human relationships to both wild and domesticated landscapes more fully. Now, it is certainly possible to object that there is something paradoxical about trying to include a study of the built environment within environmental ethics. Some might argue that nature is precisely that which is neither human nor sullied by human artifice or interference. If environmental ethics analyzes human interactions with nature so defined, then how could human interactions with a fundamentally domesticated nature be relevant to the goals of environmental ethics? Bill McKibben, for example, has written of the end of nature on the assumption that nature is the domain of what has not been affected by human beings. 6 Moreover, the recognition accorded to Robert Elliot's "Faking Nature" also suggests a strong current of support for the notion that what needs study, protection, and defense is not the built environment-we have too much of that already-but nature, or the wild environment. 7 My argument that we should also focus attention on the built environment clearly presupposes that this picture of environmental ethics is unsound. From a practical point of view, it is unproductive to ignore the environmental contexts in which people live and then expect that these people will turn out to support environmentally responsible aspirations and practices.
From a more theoretical point of view, however, I argue that the current view of environmental ethics is too narrow. Arguments in favor of preserving and protecting natural ecosystems and processes must be situated in broader 8 See Roger J. H. King, "Narrative, Imagination, and the Search for Intelligibility in Environmental Ethics," Ethics and the Environment 4 (1999): 23-38. 9 Buchler, Nature and Judgment, p. 29.
narratives that integrate wild nature with the other moral, social, political, and personal commitments that guide people's expectations and understandings of themselves and their world. 8 In particular, concern for the fate of wild nature must be integrated into a broader moral context of concern for the sites of human habitation, the problems of justice in human social life, and the future of individual and community self-development. A static halt-and-withdraw strategy which presupposes that humans are at best interlopers on what should otherwise have been a nonhuman scene involves a self-destructive logic. Such a strategy holds nothing open for the future; the narrative line ends in tragedy for nature and for human beings. The narrative that still needs to be articulated must reveal a direction for human action, self-understanding, and aspiration that points beyond the current practical and theoretical antagonism between the human and the nonhuman. By writing this narrative through our communal practice-including our architectural, design, and urban planning practiceswe may be enabled eventually to discover a place for human beings that is neither a romantic return to the "primitive" nor a glorification of "shallow" management technocracy.
BUCHLER AND EXHIBITIVE JUDGMENT
Construction of the built environment-design of buildings and cityscapes, creation of artifacts, organization of the agricultural landscape-shapes materials, arranges them in patterns, establishes new relationships among them and between them and their users. In the process, human beings take a stand in the world; their contrivances amount to judgments of what is appropriate, significant, trivial, or irrelevant. The built environment functions in terms of what Buchler calls "exhibitive judgment." According to Buchler, there are three types of human judgment: the assertive, the exhibitive, and the active. On his view, we make judgments not only through our verbal assertions, but also by what we make or contrive, and by how we act. Refusing to give priority to assertive judgment, Buchler suggests that we look to all three forms of judgment to see how an individual or community takes a stand in the world. "Each judgment is the individual's situational recognition of his universe. . . . The judgment reflects both the impact of the universe and the momentum of the self." 9 According to Buchler, by analyzing a person's judgments, or reviewing the combined judgments of the members of a community, we may be able to establish the "directionality" of the self or group: the patterns of asserting, making, and doing that determine who and what they are, their "contour. notion of directionality is a useful one. It suggests that the being of the self cannot be specified in a static, once-and-for-all sense, but rather that it takes place in time and locates itself in space. Indeed, it may ultimately remain indeterminate or incomplete. To emphasize the directional character of the self "means . . . that certain potentialities of doing, making, and saying, and certain potential relations to other things, are excluded from his future while others are included in it, all by virtue of the cumulative power of his past in total relation to his world." 10 Our judgments serve, then, to reveal the direction inherent in our existence as individuals or, to the extent that individual judgments overlap, in the life of the community. Judgments do so by establishing a pattern of stances that affect the actualities as well as the possibilities that exist in the world. If we are interested in developing a conception of environmental ethics that imagines and argues for a more environmentally responsible way of life, then we must understand the directionality that is already built into our individual selves and the combined character of our communities. Like an oil tanker at sea, we are always already on a course that, once established, has its own momentum, and this momentum must be correctly analyzed and accounted for before a new course can be laid out that will avoid the hazards ahead.
Buchler insists that the exhibitive judgments that mark our stance in the world are inherently interpretive in character. In the case of the built environment, our judgments interpret nature by rearranging natural objects and forces in certain ways, while neglecting alternative arrangements. As Buchler puts it: "Nature refashioned is nature interpreted. Every product is a judgment." 11 For example, to straighten out and pave over a stream flowing through a town is a different exhibitive judgment from a design that preserves its meandering course, together with its associated wetlands and floodplains. The one judgment constructs changes both in the actual and in the possible that the other does not. Both judgments reveal different stances on the part of the human beings involved towards the stream, its inhabitants, its functional role in filtering and storing runoff, and its potential as a resource for local people. These contrivances constitute interpretations of nature that are open to critical scrutiny by both the "assertive" or theoretical judgments of environmental philosophy and the "active" or activist judgments of citizens.
A critique of such an exhibitive judgment or construction serves, in Buchler's terms, to "articulate" the judgment and to "ramify" it. A critique articulates a judgment by putting it in touch with objects, ideas, or relations that were not initially part of the judgment. In the process, analysis reveals more about the judgment by indicating new relations and new possibilities inherent in it. 12 Vol. 22 13 Buchler, Metaphysics of Natural Complexes, p. 104.
Thus, straightening out the stream may have made sense in order to increase the amount of land available for development in the town center, but this order of relationship is not the only one that we can identify. An environmentalist critic, for example, might link the design choice, this exhibitive judgment, to a decrease in wetland area and a resulting decrease in biological diversity. A town planner's analysis might link the design to a loss of water in dry seasons, to lost opportunities for a green park that local citizens might use, or to increased sewage costs due to the absence of wetlands to help purify the water. These critical analyses reveal new relations between the actual exhibitive contrivance and actualities and possibilities not originally encompassed in the redesign of the stream.
Buchler's concept of articulation applies both to the activities of people and to the effects of a particular exhibitive judgment. While philosophers, town planners, and engineers may articulate an exhibitive judgment by means of their assertive judgments-their commentaries, objections, disagreements, and alternative proposals-the exhibitive judgment itself articulates and ramifies the materials it arranges and reshapes. The straightening of the stream is itself an articulation of water, cement, soil, and ecological interactions that reveals new forms of actuality and possibility. Thus, our exhibitive judgments articulate natural and social environments by linking them to domains of objects, ideas, plans, or natural forces that would otherwise have had nothing to do with one another.
According to Buchler, "Relations are the ramifications of a complex . . . when two complexes are related, each diminishes, enlarges, or keeps constant the scope of the other." 13 When the engineers straighten a stream bed and redirect its flow through a cement culvert, for example, some elements of the original ecosystem are diminished, others enlarged, and perhaps others are left constant. When we make exhibitive judgments of this kind, we unavoidably change the relationships between naturally occurring elements in the landscape and bring them into relationship with other elements introduced from the outside. These latter elements will include both new materials (the cement), but also new forces (human control of water flow). For Buchler, these changes in relations constitute changes in the "contour" of both the individual elements and their original configurations. That is, change has been introduced to the full range both of their actualities and their future possibilities.
In Buchler's metaphysics, possibilities are as efficacious as actualities and changing the set of possibilities that defines the contour of a given natural complex is as real as changing its present actuality: "The encounter with possibilities is at least as important and extensive as the encounter with actualities. Actuality is neither more nor less fundamental morally than possibility. Men are reliant on, restricted by, surprised to discover, and frightened by 14 Ibid., p. 148.
possibilities." 14 In ramifying natural complexes through our judgmentswhether these complexes are physical objects, relationships, ideas, or aesthetic experiences, to name a few-we change their relationships and thus their very nature. When a Shakespeare play is interpreted using Freudian psychoanalytic categories, or when a Taoist concept of the self is translated by deep ecologists, or when trees are planted along the north side of a home to block the winter wind, natural complexes have been ramified and articulated by our judgments. These complexes exist as fluid and dynamic contours whose future possibilities are as integral to what they are as their current actualities. From this point of view, it is clear why human beings must begin to take responsibility not only for their immediate impacts, but for the effect of these impacts on the full contour of the complexes we are affecting.
Of course, human beings are not unlike nonhuman forces in their ability to alter the natural configurations or the world. A hurricane, forest fire, or earthquake might equally well rearrange existing "natural complexes," change their existing relationships, and redefine their "contour" by altering current actualities and future possibilities. This effect of exhibitive judgment is not in itself external to nature. What is different is the fact that our own exhibitive judgments reflect and constrain us. They issue from our own orientation to the world and feed back on that orientation. The moral significance of this difference is crucial for environmental ethics. Yet, we can insist on this difference without erasing the essential continuity between ourselves and other forces in the natural landscape.
A different example of ramification through human exhibitive judgment can be found in the practice of wine making. In making wine, certain configurations of soil, climate, and elevation become the terroir that, in conjunction with human knowledge and labor, produce wines of a particular kind. The wine grower's art-through assertive, exhibitive, and active judgments-link environmental factors into a natural complex that did not exist before. The wine maker's product articulates and ramifies the terroir, revealing new possibilities.
While the wine maker's product articulates and ramifies the terroir in a particularly satisfying way, human contrivance and construction do not always produce such harmonious results. Irrigation salinizes the soil in semiarid conditions, excess phosphorus from fertilizers runs off into lakes and produces algae blooms that gradually kill them, and the construction of skyscrapers may create wind tunnels producing winds strong enough to knock a person down. In each of these cases, the products of human contrivance, our exhibitive judgments, articulate and change the contours of soil and water, fertilizers and algae, cement and wind in ways that create new actualities and new possibilities for future harm.
The example of the wine grower contrasts importantly with some other examples of human judgment. While the wine grower's product emerges from a conscious and methodical effort to produce this exhibitive product, many other products, like those above, do not. They reveal flaws and blind spots in the articulative process, and, as judgments, these natural complexes reveal the lack of foresight and knowledge, or the carelessness of those who produced them. They are interpretations of nature that uncover new possibilities in nature at the same time that they display the stances taken by the interpreters. When we build, then, we assemble elements of nature, mold and shape them, and arrange them to fulfill certain intentions. In so doing, we pick out only some elements as relevant or significant; others are unknown or neglected. Our products-the new housing estate, mall, office building, or home-not only show what nature is amenable to but also what we are capable of. Cities that are polluted, wasteful of energy, ugly, dangerous, parasitic on their surrounding regions, or biologically oversimplified, function as exhibitive judgments that articulate the directionality of human individuals and communities. They tell us where we stand, what we have wrought.
If Buchler is right, and our products reveal ourselves as well as articulate the nature of nature itself by setting it into new relations, we must conclude that the process of growing an environmentally literate culture must include a methodical reconstruction of our present built environment. This reconstruction must be guided by more attention to the ways in which our constructions articulate local environments, natural materials, waste sinks, both closing off and opening up particular environmental and human possibilities.
I have argued thus far that the built environment functions as an exhibitive judgment that articulates nature and reveals our stance toward it. Critical analysis of our exhibitive judgments, of the built environment in particular, allows us to articulate the impact, significance, and alternatives that such constructions have either created or foreclosed. The built environment serves, then, as interpretation, commentary, and reformulation of natural elements and thereby reveals the seriousness and competence or the carelessness and poor vision of its makers.
BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING
In this section, I argue that our built environment deserves attention from environmental ethics because it exercises influence on our own self-understanding. Our exhibitive judgments not only contrive to shape material external to us, but also help to fashion our own self-interpretation. Under current conditions, it may be argued that the built environment inhibits our ability to imagine and implement an environmentally responsible world.
Ihde writes that "if I am always already in a world, and if it is by means of the world that I come to understand myself, then there is an essential sense in 15 which self-understanding is always tied to an understanding of a world." 15 This conclusion follows from the phenomenological critique of the Cartesian view of the self. This critique rejects the notion of a self-enclosed self, undetermined by and separate from the world it knows and perceives. According to Ihde, following Husserl, the self is always "correlated with a world." 16 Ihde concludes, therefore, that we "end up modelling ourselves upon the very 'world' we project and interpret ourselves in terms of that world." 17 Our current predicament can be traced in part to the character of the "world" we inhabit. In our technological culture, Ihde writes, " [n] ature is at best a background, often spectacular but not itself a force to be reckoned with. Its limits have been conquered . . . what is foreground is totalized culture. Life takes shape within and often literally inside various forms of technological cocoons. Home is a spaceship." 18 If we apply these insights to the built environment, we can see clearly the relevance of philosophical analysis of the built environment to environmental ethics. Contemporary cityscapes not only degrade local ecosystems, waste materials, and pollute the environment, but they also minimize human contact with the diversity of nonhuman beings and relationships. The prevalence of the artifactual in our "world" reinforces our tendency to focus on the artifactual in ourselves, our self-made nature, our transcendence of evolutionary and ecological dependencies.
In "Why Do Humans Think They are Machines?" Ihde writes:
THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
An other is chosen as relevant to humanness and the insights developed therefore are reflexively internalized as a metaphorical self-interpretation. . . . Our deanimated or mechanized "world" is internalized in a fashion not different from the way archaic humans reflected their more animistic (familiar to them) "world. " 19 This passage supports the conclusion that environmentally responsible cultures will have to think critically about the built environment they inhabit and find ways to revise and reconstruct our current "mechanized" surroundings. Since human consciousness is always already correlated with a content, a "world," it will not be sufficient to theorize solely about the value of nonhuman nature. We will need to think about how to arrange our experience of it in such a way that it supports and animates a responsible care both for wild nature and for that domain of nature explicitly reformulated for human flourishing. 
BUILT ENVIRONMENT AS EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT
Ihde's argument allows us to see how the built environment stands in a dynamic and dialectical relationship with human self-understanding. How we construct our world will affect our motivation, imagination, and commitment to environmental responsibility and sustainability. However, an environmentally responsible culture will need to rethink its exhibitive judgments not only because of the reflexive impact on their self-understanding, but also because of the objective external constraints on practice which these judgments impose.
Winner has argued that technologies are something more than the individual objects or artifacts in which they are manifested. He writes that . . . the important question about technology becomes, As we "make things work," what kind of world are we making? This suggests we pay attention not only to the making of physical instruments and processes . . . but also to the production of psychological, social, and political conditions as a part of any significant technical change. Are we going to design and build circumstances that enlarge possibilities for growth in human freedom, sociability, intelligence, creativity, and selfgovernment? Or are we headed in an altogether different direction? 20 We might add here that we should also pay attention to how technological systems affect our experience of nonhuman nature, our ability to see ourselves as members of communities that extend beyond the boundaries of immediate habitation, and the possibilities for developing a responsible relationship with both the built and wild environments.
Returning to Buchler, we might rephrase Winner's insight about the implications of new technologies. To introduce a new technology is not only to construct an actual object; it is also to open up new possibilities and to foreclose others. The automobile, for example, opens up possibilities of free movement, forms of individuality, new construction, tourism, and cultural life, but effectively inhibits efforts to maintain clean air and water, public transportation, or a sense of commitment to place. The object, therefore, the car, mediates a series of actualities and possibilities; its creation establishes a new natural complex whose "contour" continues to be articulated and ramified over time.
Winner describes several different examples of how technological choices have constrained social choices. While the automobile is one of the most obvious, others include Robert Moses' imposition of height limitations in the design of overpasses on Long Island and the preference for nuclear power over alternative energy sources. By limiting the height of the overpasses, Moses was able to prevent public transportation from reaching Jones Beach. This effec-tively barred poor, non-white citizens of New York from using that park. Likewise, by supporting nuclear power generation, our society commits itself to all the problems of waste disposal, safety, and surveillance that are required to make the power economically and socially viable. Meanwhile, alternatives that might be less polluting, more easily controlled, maintained, and used by non-experts, and less locked in to future hazards, are left languishing.
Of course, the built environment both uses and relies on technologies. We have, for example, adopted private cars for transportation, centrally generated sources of energy, synthetic construction materials, and wasteful building techniques. These technologies are constituted by objects, but also by processes of production, impacts on people and nature, foreclosed opportunities, and dangerous future possibilities. Their "contour," as Buchler might say, extends much further than the physical objects themselves. As such, the built environment is the focal point of a network of commitments and opportunities-a way of life-that leave the present and future generations indebted. Nuclear power, hydroelectric dams, high-rise buildings, synthetic or exotic materials, poorly designed spaces, all limit our ability to reinterpret the natural environment more responsibly, and thus constrain our hopes for a sustainable human relationship to nature.
THE SOCIALITY OF NATURE
In the previous three sections, I have offered ways of approaching the built environment that demonstrate its relevance to the projects of environmental ethics. In this section, I say something further against the human-nature dualism that seems to separate the concerns of environmental ethics from those of green design, architecture, and planning. Vogel writes that THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT . . . nature is always itself socially constituted and constructed. The world we live in is a world constituted in and through the socially (and linguistically) organized practices we engage in every day-including, of course, the practices of technology and of science. Never a "nature-in-itself," the nature we actually inhabit is one that always already shows the mark of the human. . . . 21 The sociality of nature lies in the social origins of our knowledge, perception, experience, and understanding of what constitutes the natural world. Indeed, the prevalent distinction between the human and the natural is a socially constructed dualism that serves purposes that are specific to time and place. The humannature dualism has supported a dominating stance towards the natural world, but it has also served, more recently, as a tactic for reining in human exploitation of nature. In this latter role, the dualism has been a useful tool, enabling members of industrial societies to formulate a conception of nonhuman value and significance that is not tied to human use. However, the dualism also emphasizes the "otherness" of nature-its alien character-and thus robs humans of the chance of being at home in nature. If this distinction is not useful for all our needs, this too is a fact about our social condition.
How does this point of view support the idea that environmental ethics should take the built environment seriously? The notion that the built environment is not an appropriate subject matter for environmental ethics derives from the view that I am questioning here, namely, that nature, unlike the humanly contructed world has a value and meaning in itself that imposes moral limits on the projects and aspirations of humans. If in fact we must take responsibility for the judgments that we make in relation to wild nature-i.e., what we come to know and assert, what we create and shape, or what we do in wild naturethen this same sense of responsibility should be seen to carry over to other, domesticated, environments as well. The overcoming of the human-nature dualism requires that environmental ethics address, not only the nonhuman world, but also what it means to be human in the world.
There is a danger in emphasizing the sociality of nature. It may appear that this point of view erases the boundary between the artifactual and the "natural" and licenses a human assimilation of nonhuman nature to human use and appropriation. Thus, if wild nature is "as much" a product of human culture as the built environment, it might appear that humans may handle wild nature as they do the built environment, with the consequence that all our current environmental problems would simply increase. One might conclude, perhaps, that since we treat the artifactual environment in purely instrumental and selfinterested terms, we may do the same with wild nature. Such a worry may underlie environmental philosophers' reluctance to theorize about the built environment.
This objection does not adequately represent the point behind the sociality of nature argument. The claim that nature is a human construct presupposes a rejection of the metaethical foundationalist desire to ground environmental ethics in a nature-in-itself that issues imperatives for human morality. It is a refusal to take the "view from the outside," as Peter van Wyck calls it in reference to deep ecology. 22 While nature may indeed speak to us, its terms and modes of communication are constructed by the particular place from which we listen. Donna Haraway and Lorraine Code have both emphasized how the attempt to take a universal point of view, a "view from the outside," a totalizing perspective leads to an erasure of the particular point of view of historically situated individuals. 23 But it is precisely these situated people, located in their various built environments, that we need to address if we are to evolve a culture of environmental respect and care.
Following Buchler again, we might argue that nature is a natural complex that can be discriminated or identified in a variety of different domains. Buchler's principle of ontological parity states that "whatever is discriminated in any way (whether it is encountered or produced or otherwise related to) is a natural complex, and no complex is more 'real,' more 'natural,' more 'genuine,' or more 'ultimate,' than any other." 24 Thus, a mountain is no more real than a rainbow or a vision. The differences between them lie not in their reality, but in the kinds of relationships they stand in to other things and the nature and extent of their impacts. In the case of nature itself, we know very well that it can be discriminated or identified in many different ways, all of which, according to Buchler, are real. Nature may be approached as resource, as spiritual refuge, as aesthetic experience, as a domain of the nonhuman, as home, as an aggregation of biological and physical properties, and in many other ways. The question of what nature "really" is misses the point that nature "really" has been understood, known, experienced, and perceived in all these ways, often by the same people. Significantly, nature has shown itself to be amenable to these different understandings and experiences, and to articulation by the three kinds of judgment identified by Buchler: scientific (assertive), artistic and artifactual (exhibitive), and exploitative or protective (active).
The view that nature is a social construct is not in itself a normative view that defends one particular use or conception of nature over another. Nonetheless, it is not a view without normative implications. Our interpretations and judgments of nature can go wrong in a number of different ways. They can fail to meet our expectations or our needs and desires. We may uncover ways in which they fail to cohere with other domains of experience and belief. Unexpected and unacceptable possibilities may turn up as elements of the new natural complexes we create. In these and other ways, human judgment of the environment may fail to "work" and thus create the ever-renewed pressure for further inquiry and discovery.
It is this pervasive character of human judgment and inquiry that ultimately grounds a normative requirement to take responsibility for how we judge, how we understand, how we know the world, both the built and the wild. As Vogel puts it, "To be reconciled with nature would mean: To make the world that surrounds us a good one, a beautiful one, one whose structures we can discursively defend." 25 The importance of protecting wild nature, like the importance of creating civilized and livable built environments, arises from the The Science Question and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991) .
24 Buchler, Metaphysics, p. 31. 25 Vogel, Against Nature, p. 189.
discussions and aspirations of individuals and communities in conversation with themselves; it is not grounded in the intrinsic value of nature itself. The notion that both our thinking about nature and our contrivances must be discursively defensible does not, of course, mean that we can rely on discourse alone to articulate the new directions an environmentally responsible culture should take. Overemphasis on discourse ignores the non-discursive role of exhibitive judgment and the objective constraints of a technology's imposed "way of life," as Winner argued. It also ignores Ihde's point that our "world" plays a role in forming the boundaries of what can be included in discourse. My argument for the importance of the built environment depends upon acknowledging the importance of making and contrivance and the power of the products of these exhibitive modes of judgment to form the context within which meaningful discourse and assertion can take place.
GREEN PRINCIPLES FOR THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
Writing about the dangers of domestication in human social life, David Macauley points to the importance of breaching the walls that keep out wild nature and insulate the built environment from the wild. However, he rejects the romantic, primitivist idea that we might do away with domestication itself and return to the wild. Instead: . . . we might first explore existing border zones and boundary situations. In short, we need to participate in, protect, value, and enlarge places at the margins of distinctively human communities, areas that frequently border, bound, or fall between the artifactual and natural extremes: beaches, swamps, foot paths, bogs, overgrown lots, river banks and levees, gardens, meadows, orchards, rooftops and the like. . . . Such feral, transitional regions are often overlooked in ecological discussions because they cannot be so neatly classified as natural or artifactual, wild or cultivated. 26 Rethinking the marginal or transitional regions between the artifactual and the natural, the built and the wild, is a central task for the conception of environmental ethics proposed in this essay. Practical work has been done in relationship to many of these marginal areas-from community and rooftop gardening in cities, to the use of wetlands to purify sewage, to the re-wilding of river banks and industrial sites. 27 In addition to the cultivation of natural areas within the city, we need to understand the metaphorical usefulness of this concept of the margin between the built and the wild. Buildings, cities, and domesticated spaces of all kinds function in part as permeable margins between the human and the nonhuman world, articulating and ramifying human interactions with the nonhuman world. If our built environment closes us off from nature and from knowledge of natural processes, we must find a way to cultivate this margin, this artifactual "skin" that mediates between human self-knowledge and knowledge of the "other" outside. The very material of our buildings, their relationships to one another in space, the degree to which their structures are sensitive to the forces of sun, wind, and water, and the extent to which our buildings enhance human well-being or promote illness, all these dimensions of the built environment mediate between the human and the natural world. How we build and design our world will have a profound effect on our ability to perceive "through" that built medium to connect with a wild nature beyond it.
My argument in this article has sought to show why the character of the built environment is significant for environmental ethics and our concern for wild nature. There is much empirical work to be done to develop the practices of green architecture and city planning. But what principles might we use to guide our building and designing processes? In concluding, let me briefly outline several principles for the greening of the built environment and discuss them in the light of our previous arguments. No claim is made here for the completeness of this list. 28 (1) The built environment should grow from place and work with, rather than neglect, natural forces in the local environment. This principle calls for a more self-conscious and methodic approach to the articulation of local places in the process of constructing the built environment. Because our exhibitive judgments construct reformulations and interpretations of the locale's natural complexes, it is incumbent upon us to exercise more care in the process of articulation and ramification. The new relations into which soil, water, air flow, and materials are placed through building create new actualities, but also new possibilities. These new possibilities form part of the "contour"of the built environment and are elements of the new natural complexes for which we should take greater responsibility. The importance of these possibilities be-comes more apparent when we remember Ihde's point about how the world as discriminated informs the process of self-understanding, and thus, the preparedness of citizens to engage in just and environmentally literate practices.
(2) The built environment should make nature a visible, palpable presence in daily human experience. This principle calls for the construction of a built environment that makes nature's presence visible, rather than obscuring it. Such a result may be accomplished not only by enhancing and making accessible natural areas within the built environment such as waterways, woodlands, and urban gardens, but also by redesigning built structures to interact more sensitively and transparently with existing environmental conditions. The visibility of nature is essential if the built environment, the locus of human inhabitation, is to contribute to, as well as reflect, a world view that acknowledges the environment outside the city, the nonhuman presence in the world. The assumption here is not just that citizens will benefit psychologically and physically from an environment in which natural processes and ecosystems are integrated, but that the presence of nature can serve as a sign referring beyond the environments of human life to those in which human presence is minimal.
(3) The built environment should show respect for its users, both contemporary and future. Because the built environment constitutes both a "world" for human awareness and self-understanding and an objective limiting condition on human practices in the present and the future, this principle reflects the need for an ethically reflective design process to consider the users of built spaces. We know, for example, that the design of the built environment can have significant impact on women's safety, as well as on the health of members of minority communities disproportionately likely to be harmed by the siting of toxic production and waste disposal. 29 Taking responsibility for our exhibitive judgments presupposes access to participation in the creation of those spaces and structures within which we live. Even more importantly, however, it presupposes that contemporary citizens see themselves in a community that has historical ties to the past and a directionality leading into the future.
(4) The built environment should manifest, in its construction and technologies, an understanding of the finiteness of energy, materials, and the capacity of the environment to absorb waste. Essentially, this principle summarizes what Yeang refers to as the ecological approach to design and architecture. "In the ecological approach to design, the designer must . . . be concerned not only with the extent and range of human use of the ecosystem and the earth's resources in the designed system, but also with the way in which these elements are abstracted, stored, assembled, used, and finally disposed of (or reintro- duced into) the biosphere." 30 Choice of materials or energy sources commits us to further development of infrastructure, despoliation of natural resources, and disposal of waste products. Responsible design, therefore, must integrate the entire process of construction from cradle to grave, learning to see the relationships between individual building projects and the entire web of current realities and future possibilities with which that project is entwined. How we build, then, is an essential element in a web of further relations, obligations, future commitments, and possibilities that need to be studied and incorporated into design.
These four principles offer a tentative way of summarizing the implications of the argument in this essay. They are a start in the process of learning to understand better the full "contours" of our built environment, by directing us to look more closely at both the intersections of the built and the wild, and at the spatial as well as temporal dimensions of self and world. Building an environment for human and nonhuman flourishing imposes constraints but creates new possibilities for articulating the nature around us and reconstructing the walls of domestication to facilitate an integration with the wild nature outside. These are some of the tasks of a fully responsible culture and they require philosophical articulation of the built environment as a complement to the defense of the value of wild ecosystems and species. 30 Yeang, Designing with Nature, pp. 56-57.
